The Super-Entity That Owns the World
A peer-reviewed network study showed a tightly interlocked “super-entity” of financial institutions controls 40% of all transnational corporate wealth
In 2007, 147 firms, mostly financial, sat at the center of an ownership network that held nearly 40 percent of the control over the world’s transnational corporations.1 Mergers have pulled that circle tighter since, and the biggest fund managers now vote shares at nearly every major American company. Disclosure has gone the other way. Domestic companies no longer have to tell the federal government who really owns them.2
The result is not an ordinary market outcome or a set of isolated regulatory failures. It is the progressive capture of both economic decision-making and political outcomes by a self-reinforcing core of financial institutions whose ultimate owners are increasingly difficult or impossible for outsiders to identify, whose overlapping stakes blunt competition among the firms they control, and whose influence over government consistently outweighs that of ordinary citizens. What the public is left with is a system in which a relative handful of largely unaccountable entities decide which industries thrive, which policies succeed, and which voices are effectively silenced, without ever having to step into the open or answer to the people whose lives they shape.
The first look at that circle came from a study few people saw and fewer understood. In October 2011, three systems theorists at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich published “The Network of Global Corporate Control.”3 Its authors called it the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network.4
The Map
Stefania Vitali and her coauthors James Glattfelder and Stefano Battiston set out to put numbers on a suspicion many people already held: that a handful of corporations dominates the global economy.5 They started with Orbis 2007, a commercial database of about 37 million companies and investors. From it they pulled 43,060 transnational corporations in 116 countries. Then they traced the ownership chains running into and out of those companies. The result was a network of about 600,000 entities joined by just over one million ownership ties.6
Ownership runs in interlocking loops. Company A owns shares in Company B, and Company B owns shares back in Company A. Control flows up through links like that, and some shareholders end up very powerful.7 The researchers built a new method so the loops wouldn’t inflate the totals.8
Network topology.
(A) A bow-tie consists of in-section (IN), out-section (OUT), strongly connected component or core (SCC), and tubes and tendrils (T&T). (B) Bow-tie structure of the largest connected component (LCC) and other connected components (OCC). Each section volume scales logarithmically with the share of its TNCs operating revenue. In parenthesis, percentage of operating revenue and number of TNCs, cfr. Table 1. (C) SCC layout of the SCC (1318 nodes and 12191 links). Node size scales logarithmically with operation revenue, node color with network control (from yellow to red). Link color scales with weight. (D) Zoom on some major TNCs in the financial sector. Some cycles are highlighted.
Source: Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston, “The Network of Global Corporate Control,” PLoS ONE 6, no. 10 (2011): e25995, fig. 2, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0025995.g002. © 2011 Vitali et al. Used under a Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
Who Holds the Control
The network formed a giant bow tie. At its center sat a very small, very dense core of 1,318 companies out of 43,060.9 Each core member was tied to about 20 others, and about three quarters of the ownership of core firms stayed with other core firms.10
Inside that core sat 147 firms the authors called an economic super-entity. That super-entity held nearly 40 percent of the control over the economic value of all the transnational corporations in the study. They also had almost full control over themselves.11 That’s 147 companies out of more than 43,000. In Glattfelder’s words, less than 1 percent of the companies controlled 40 percent of the network.12 This concentration held under all three models the authors used to estimate control.13
The 2007 top ten were Barclays, Capital Group, FMR, AXA, State Street, JPMorgan Chase, Legal & General, Vanguard, UBS and Merrill Lynch. Goldman Sachs ranked 18th and Morgan Stanley 21st. The top 50 spanned ten countries.14
That list has been rearranged since, mostly by mergers. BlackRock wasn’t in the 2007 top 50. In December 2009 it bought Barclays Global Investors, a unit of the firm ranked first.15 Lehman Brothers, ranked 34th, collapsed in September 2008.16 Bank of America, ranked 25th, bought Merrill Lynch, ranked tenth, on January 1, 2009.17 UBS, ranked ninth, took over Credit Suisse, ranked 14th, in June 2023.18 Franklin Resources, ranked 13th, bought Legg Mason, ranked 20th, in July 2020.19 On October 1, 2026, Nuveen, which TIAA owns, completed its purchase of Schroders. TIAA ranked 29th and Schroders 32nd.20 Four of those deals folded one top 50 firm into another.
Three quarters of the core were financial firms.21 Banks and investment firms move the world’s capital. They decide who gets loans and which industries get investment, so some thrive and others starve. Whoever controls that flow controls more than their shareholdings suggest. The authors wrote that the top holders are in a position to exert considerable control, through votes at shareholder and board meetings or through informal negotiation.22
Why Concentration Matters
Tight links make a network fragile. The authors warned that a network this dense looks sturdy in good times and pulls many firms into distress together in bad times, and they said the recent financial turmoil showed that pattern.23 In September 2008 the failure of Lehman Brothers and the looming collapse of AIG forced the government to choose between risking the collapse of the financial system and a taxpayer rescue.24
Competition suffers too. Many firms in the core have overlapping lines of business, and ownership ties among them open a path to blocs that hurt competition.25 When the same institutions hold large stakes in supposed rivals, what does competition mean?
The concentration didn’t stop in 2007. By 2019 the three biggest index fund managers, which run funds that track the stock market, cast about 25 percent of the votes at S&P 500 companies on average, and two scholars projected a path to as much as 40 percent within two decades.26 State Street and Vanguard were already in the ETH top ten. BlackRock joined them at the top by buying Barclays Global Investors.
From the Boardroom to Washington
Now follow the power into politics. In 2014, Martin Gilens of Princeton and Benjamin Page of Northwestern published “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” which tested four theories of American politics against data on 1,779 policy issues from 1981 to 2002. They found that economic elites and business oriented interest groups have substantial independent influence on policy, while average citizens and mass based interest groups have little or no independent influence.27 Proposals with high elite support passed about 45 percent of the time, and proposals with low elite support passed about 18 percent of the time. Policy changed about 30 percent of the time whether a minority or a majority of citizens supported it.28 The authors concluded that if business interests and a small number of affluent Americans dominate policymaking, the country’s claim to democratic governance is badly undermined.29
The first study shows how concentrated control is inside corporations. The second shows who wins when policy gets decided. When a few institutions hold that much control, and business groups outweigh ordinary citizens in Washington, power sits where voters can’t reach it.
Who Owns the Owners
Vanguard ranked eighth in 2007. By 2017 it held stakes of 5 percent or more in essentially all of the S&P 500, up from fifteen companies in 2007, and the three biggest index fund managers generally vote all of their shares.30 So who owns Vanguard? Vanguard says The Vanguard Group, Inc. is owned by its US funds and ETFs, and those funds are owned by their investors.31 The answer runs in a circle and ends at no named owner. A firm with a stake in nearly every major American company has nobody above it you can point to.
Vanguard isn’t the only one. Capital Group, currently ranked eighth, calls itself privately owned.32 Fidelity, whose parent FMR ranked third in 2007, still ranks third by money managed today and says it has been privately held since 1946.33 So three of the top eight are firms whose shares the public can’t buy. A public company has to name its large shareholders in SEC filings. These firms aren’t public companies. A map can show everything they own. Above them, it shows very little.
The Owners Nobody Has to Name
You can’t check power you can’t see. The ETH team built its map from the ownership records available to it, and ownership that nobody records can’t appear on any map. American law has made that easier to arrange.
In 2012, the study “Global Shell Games” had researchers posing as customers send more than 7,400 emails to more than 3,700 corporate service providers in 182 countries specifically asking them to set up anonymous shell companies.34 The United States was among the worst offenders, and Delaware, Nevada, Montana and Wyoming were among the easiest places in the world to set one up. Researchers closed a US deal in under three hours after about a dozen approaches, and the same job in tax havens took more than twice the time and effort.35
The Corporate Transparency Act required companies to report their real owners to the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.36 Treasury suspended enforcement against domestic companies in March 2025, and the network then removed the reporting requirement for them.37 It announced a final rule on August 11, 2026, effective August 14, that locked in the change. Now only certain foreign entities registered to do business in the United States report, and they report only owners who aren’t US persons.38 A May 2026 report from the Government Accountability Office warned that the domestic exemption leaves gaps in ownership information and raises the risk of illicit finance.39 A US company can now keep its real owners off the federal record, and the law allows it.
The Study That Vanished
When the paper came out in October 2011, New Scientist ran a feature as Occupy protests spread.40 Then public attention faded. The first study to put numbers on the concentration of global corporate control became a footnote.41 Since then, policy has moved toward less ownership disclosure, not more.
Network topology doesn’t fit neatly into a news segment. The finding also cuts against the story we tell ourselves about free markets and fair competition.
When Charters Ran Out
Corporations didn’t always work this way. In early America a legislature had to pass a law to create one, and the charter spelled out what the company could do.42 Early charters named a public purpose, and most weren’t perpetual.43 They ran for a set number of years, and renewal gave the legislature a chance to check how the company had behaved.44 In 1785 Pennsylvania revoked the charter of the Bank of North America.45
General incorporation laws ended that. New York passed the first in 1811, and by 1875 more than 90 percent of states offered one.46 State oversight of how corporations were created and monitored shrank.47 The trust came next. In 1882 the stock of about forty corporations went to nine trustees who issued certificates in return, which put the whole combination under one control.48 Congress answered with the Sherman Act in 1890, which declared illegal any “combination in the form of trust or otherwise” in restraint of trade.49 In 1899 the same control moved into a holding corporation in New Jersey, and the Supreme Court ruled against it in 1911.50
The old rule fits the problem the ETH map shows. A corporation’s charter that ends on a set date, with renewal only after a public showing of benefit, would give voters a way to review firms that no shareholder vote can reach. We should bring it back for the largest corporations. Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act, reintroduced in December 2024, would require corporations with more than $1 billion in annual revenue to hold a federal charter.51 A charter that expires would go further.
A Republic Has to See
A republic rests on one rule: the people can see who holds the power. That’s why we make our laws in public and try our cases in open court. Yet faceless entities are taking over the economy one merger and one acquisition at a time, and the law lets them stay unseen. Nobody voted for it. Nobody was asked. Each deal leaves fewer hands on the controls, and the owners behind those hands get harder to find. Choice is the first freedom to go. When the same few names sit behind rival firms, a worker or a customer has nowhere else to turn, and the decisions that shape a life get made in rooms no citizen can enter.
Bring back charters that end on a set date. Make every large owner put its real owners on the public record. Our children will inherit whatever we allow now, and a country can’t govern what it isn’t allowed to see. The map exists. Now the owners behind it have to step into view.
Notes
1. Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston, “The Network of Global Corporate Control,” PLoS ONE 6, no. 10 (2011): e25995, Discussion, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0025995.
2. Morrison & Foerster, “FinCEN Ends Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements for U.S. Companies,” 2026, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/260820-fincen-ends-beneficial-ownership-reporting.
3. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control.”
4. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” abstract.
5. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Introduction.
6. Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, and Stefano Battiston, “The Network of Global Corporate Control,” preprint, arXiv:1107.5728, Supporting Information, sec. 2, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.5728.
7. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Methods.
8. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” preprint, Supporting Information, sec. 3.2.
9. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” fig. 2C; Andy Coghlan and Debora MacKenzie, “Revealed: The Capitalist Network That Runs the World,” New Scientist, October 19, 2011, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354-500-revealed-the-capitalist-network-that-runs-the-world/.
10. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Results, “Network Topology.”
11. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Discussion.
12. Coghlan and MacKenzie, “Revealed.”
13. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Results, “Concentration of Control.”
14. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” preprint, Supporting Information, Table S1.
15. BlackRock, Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2009 (Washington, DC: US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010), Item 1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001364742/000119312510052764/d10k.htm.
16. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011), “Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” https://www.govinfo.gov/features/financial-crisis-inquiry-report.
17. Bank of America Corporation, press release, Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, January 1, 2009, https://investor.bankofamerica.com/regulatory-and-other-filings/select-sec-filings/content/0000950123-09-000010/y73597exv99w1.htm.
18. Geir Moulson and Courtney Bonnell, “UBS Completes Takeover of Credit Suisse in Deal Meant to Stem Global Financial Turmoil,” Associated Press, June 12, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ubs-completes-takeover-of-credit-suisse-in-deal-meant-to-stem-global-financial-turmoil.
19. Mike Sheen, “Update: Franklin Templeton Completes Legg Mason Tie-Up,” Investment Week, August 3, 2020, https://investmentweek.co.uk/news/4010964/update-franklin-templeton-completes-legg-mason-tie-up.
20. Jack Roach, “Nuveen Completes Schroders Acquisition to Create $2.6trn Mega-Manager,” Investment Week, October 1, 2026, https://www.investmentweek.co.uk/news/4536620/nuveen-completes-schroders-acquisition-create-usd26trn-mega-manager; “Nuveen Completes Acquisition of Schroders,” 401(k) Specialist, October 1, 2026, https://401kspecialistmag.com/nuveen-completes-acquisition-of-schroders/.
21. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Discussion.
22. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Discussion.
23. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Discussion.
24. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, “Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.”
25. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Discussion.
26. Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, “The Specter of the Giant Three,” Boston University Law Review 99, no. 3 (2019), ECGI Finance Working Paper no. 608/2019, https://www.ecgi.global/publications/working-papers/the-specter-of-the-giant-three. The three managers are BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors.
27. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714001595.
28. Journalist’s Resource, “The Influence of Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Voters on American Politics,” accessed October 20, 2026, https://journalistsresource.org/politics-and-government/the-influence-of-elites-interest-groups-and-average-voters-on-american-politics/.
29. Gilens and Page, “Testing Theories,” Conclusion.
30. Bebchuk and Hirst, “Specter of the Giant Three.”
31. Vanguard, “About Us,” Vanguard Asset Services (UK), accessed October 20, 2026, https://www.vanguard.co.uk/adviser/adv/about-vanguard/about-us.
32. Capital Group, “About Us,” accessed October 20, 2026, https://www.capitalgroup.com/about-us.html.
33. Fidelity Investments, corporate home page, accessed October 20, 2026, https://about.fidelity.com/.
34. Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson, and Jason Sharman, Global Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers’ and Terrorist Financiers’ Access to Shell Companies (2012), hosted by the FACT Coalition, https://thefactcoalition.org/report/global-shell-games-testing-money-launderers-terrorist-financiers-access-shell-companies/.
35. “The Buck Stops Here,” Life and Letters, University of Texas at Austin College of Liberal Arts, April 2014, https://lifeandletters.la.utexas.edu/2014/04/the-buck-stops-here-government-professor-shows-how-money-laundering-is-easy-as-ever-in-the-united-states/.
36. FinCEN, “FinCEN Removes Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements for U.S. Companies and U.S. Persons, Sets New Deadlines for Foreign Companies,” news release, March 21, 2025, https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-removes-beneficial-ownership-reporting-requirements-us-companies-and-us.
37. Holland & Knight, “What Happened to FinCEN’s Corporate Transparency Act?,” June 22, 2026, https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/06/what-happened-to-fincens-corporate-transparency-act; FinCEN, “FinCEN Removes Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements,” news release.
38. Morrison & Foerster, “FinCEN Ends Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements.”
39. Holland & Knight, “What Happened to FinCEN’s Corporate Transparency Act?”
40. Coghlan and MacKenzie, “Revealed.”
41. Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, “Network of Global Corporate Control,” Results, “Concentration of Control.”
42. Susan Pace Hamill, “From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations,” American University Law Review 49 (1999): 81, https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1281&context=aulr.
43. Ralph Gomory and Richard Sylla, “The American Corporation,” Dædalus, Spring 2013, https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/american-corporation.
44. Gomory and Sylla, “The American Corporation.”
45. Hamill, “From Special Privilege to General Utility.”
46. Hamill, “From Special Privilege to General Utility.”
47. Gomory and Sylla, “The American Corporation.”
48. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0221_0001_ZS.html.
49. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.
50. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.
51. Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, press release on the Accountable Capitalism Act, December 11, 2024, https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=28807.
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